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Briefly stated: a motive has its being in the totality which thinks it, and does not possess reality until the mind gives it to it by realizing it through volition. The motive arises through the thinking, which abstracts from some reality its potentiality and thus makes a motive. If the motive becomes actualized it ceases to be a motive. To say that a motive constrains the will, is to hold that a non-existent constrains an existent. But to say that the motive constrains the will, and to acknowledge that the motive is caused by the mind, is to make the mind in volition *causa sui* in very deed. For mind initiates the act, which reflects back upon itself though the motive. Unless the archetype of the act exists for consciousness in the form of motive, the act, though spontaneous, is not *for* the Ego, and may be called involuntary, like the action of the heart, lungs, &c.

At the outset one must settle whether all things are externally constrained or determined. Finding that self-determination is the highest fact, he then can approach the subject of the Will. He must next investigate the ideas of Efficient and Final Causes. A confusion of these two species of causes prevents a solution. Efficient cause is the first principle of fatalism, Final cause is the first principle of freedom.

The excellent reflections on this topic in "Hazard on the Will" (published by the Appletons) are to be recommended to those interested. (See Book Notices in this Journal, vol. iv. p. 95.)

EDITOR.

We have received the following communication regarding Professor Vera's recent review of Strauss's book, noticed in our last number:

M. le rédacteur du J. S. P.—Ce qu'un grand homme a affirmé à l'égard des langues est encore plus vrai à l'égard des philosophies; celui qui n'en connaît qu'une n'en connaît aucune. C'est le cas du professeur Véra, qui, regardant, pour des raisons suffisantes, sans doute, la philosophie hégélienne comme la seule vraie philosophie,* et, par conséquent, la religion chrétienne comme la religion absolue,† vient d'entreprendre la réfutation ou plutôt la démolition de l'ouvrage récent du docteur Strauss, *L'ancienne et la nouvelle Foi*.‡

Quoi que l'on pense des principes ou des résultats philosophiques du docteur Strauss, personne ne s'avisera probablement de nier que ce ne soit un écrivain excellent, un logicien profond, un érudit des premiers, et comme il n'est pas tenu d'accepter les principes de Hegel, l'attaque de M. Véra ne

* Si la vérité est une vérité déterminée, la philosophie aussi doit être une philosophie déterminée, et, s'il n'y a qu'une vérité, il n'y a ni ne peut y avoir qu'une philosophie. Et cette philosophie, je ne me lasserai pas de le répéter, et, autant qu'il est en moi, de le démontrer, est la philosophie hégélienne. (P. 2.)

† Nous prétendons que la religion chrétienne est la religion absolue en tant que religion, et cela parceque, d'une part, c'est l'unité de toutes les religions, et que, d'autre part, son principe est celui qui se rapproche le plus de la philosophie, de telle façon que la christianisme est virtuellement la philosophie. (P. 73.)

‡ STRAUSS, *L'Ancienne et la Nouvelle Foi*. Par A. Véra, Professeur de la Philosophie à l'Université de Naples. Naples: Detken et Rocholl, Place du Plébiscite, 1873.

saurait être que très-faible, ce qu'elle est en effet. Bien que nous ne soyons pas de ceux qui refusent à la religion toute validité,—elle a, bien entendu, sa valeur et sa place à elle, dans les cœurs de ceux qui ne peuvent monter à un point de vue philosophique—cependant, nous affirmons que la religion, comme telle, ne saurait jamais être absolue, ni virtuellement ni autrement, et qu'à mesure qu'elle devient philosophique, c'est-à-dire, qu'elle se rapproche de l'absolu, elle cesse d'être religion et devient philosophie. Aussi, sur ce point, nous sommes parfaitement d'accord avec Strauss, qui, selon nous, ne fait que combattre, dans l'intérêt de la philosophie, une religion devenue obstructive au progrès et, partant, plus qu'inutile. Cela ne veut pas dire que nous approuvions la philosophie par laquelle Strauss désire remplacer le christianisme; tant s'en faut. Enfin nous prendrons la liberté de rappeler à la mémoire de M. Vera une chose qu'il paraît avoir oubliée, savoir, qu'attaquer un ouvrage avec des armes tirées de l'arsenal d'un système que l'auteur de cet ouvrage ne reconnaît pas, n'est pas du tout dans l'esprit de la philosophie de hégélienne dont il se déclare le disciple dévoué.

St. Louis, le 10 Avril, 1874.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

Is Inorganic Matter Dynamical?

Mr. Editor:

I read in your journal, and have read before, that both Kant and Hegel define inorganic nature as dynamical; it is simply mathematical. Dynamics appear in organic nature as well. Is not our idea of power from our own consciousness in organic nature? If not, that of horse power certainly is derived from organic matter.

In inorganic nature, form or structure (e.g. crystallization), composition (witness the law of definite proportions), motion, force in its development and in its distribution, harmony, and so forth, are all regulated mathematically. Organic nature breaks loose from these conditions and limits, and is emphatically teleological. Here form, composition, motion, and the outgoing of force, is according to the end in view. In both departments the properties of matter are the same. In each, these properties are made to work out all that can be deduced from them under their respective limits. Take, for instance, the properties of elasticity and of muscular contractility. The former is cohesion with a to and fro movement among the cohering molecules according to mathematical law; the latter is cohesion with a to and fro movement of the cohering molecules according to volition. The highest attainment of the first is perhaps the production of musical sounds. The last stops not here; but while it loses nothing that it has attained in inorganic nature, strives through all inferior animated nature till it reaches its final goal in the human voice, viz. in the production of articulate language. Thus, with the greatest economy of means, the same apparatus that distributes the air to the blood to enable it to avail itself in the most perfect manner of its chemical properties, so modifies itself in this very act of distribution as to compel the mechanical properties of the same substance into subservience to the highest and latest function which mind performs in connection with matter.